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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Vietnam is a rising economic star and considered as a future dragon in the Asia-Pacific 
region with the average Gross Domestic Product (GDP) growth rate of 6.2% over the period 
2006-2012 (WB 2016). Due to the relatively underdeveloped capital market2, the Vietnamese 
banking system plays an essential role in the economy since it contributes 16% to 18% 
toward annual GDP (Stewart, Matousek & Nguyen 2016). Yet, it has long remained 
undercapitalised and higher level of non-performing loans (NPL).3 
Along with other reforms, the State Bank of Vietnam (SBV) officially released the minimum 
charter capital requirements for commercial banks with the main objective of reducing risk 
and improving bank efficiency. Accordingly, all commercial banks must achieve at least 
VND 3,000 billion by the end of 2010 (The Vietnamese Government 2011). This requirement 
affects bank behaviour in different ways. For small banks, they seem to face greater difficulty 
in terms of raising their capital to meet the minimum charter capital requirement in the short 
time due to unfavourable conditions of the Vietnamese stock market. This, therefore, may 
induce them to seek high profits via over-branching or excessive risk-taking. For large banks, 
it is not hard for them to meet the minimum charter capital requirement because their higher 
capital was injected by the government. Under a moral hazard hypothesis, this free injection, 
however, may also affect adversely their management behaviour such as having less 
incentive to monitor costs or over-financing to state-owned enterprises that are poor 
management and have higher risk projects. In fact, the NPL ratio of the Vietnamese banking 
system significantly increased in the period 2007-2011 and reached the peak in 2008 
(Vietcombank Securities Company 2011). This further raises a concern on whether this 
capital requirement should be really adequate for Vietnamese banks to reduce risk and 
improve efficiency.  
Furthermore, the literature shows that capital and risk are related to the level of bank 
efficiency. Hughes and Mester (1998) demonstrate that more efficiency banks with the high 
quality of management may have greater flexibility of their financial leverage or overall risk 
profile, ceteris paribus. However, a less efficient bank with low capital tends to take higher 
risk under moral hazard considerations. As such, Vietnam offers a particularly interesting 
environment in which to investigate this critical issue. 
It is surprising that only a few studies examining the links among risk, capitalisation and bank 
efficiency. The literature is dominated by studies from the US and Europe where larger 
markets and number of banks have facilitated economic modelling. The earlier studies 
suggest that efficiency and capital are relevant determinants of bank risk. Berger and 
DeYoung (1997) suggest that problem loans reduce cost efficiency and a reduction in cost 
efficiency precedes increases in problem loans, especially at highly leveraged banks in the 
US. Similarly, another study by Kwan and Eisenbeis (1997) using the US data conclude that 
poor-performing banks are prone to risk-taking than better-performing ones. Their findings 
also indicate that well-capitalized banks operate more efficiently than less-capitalized peers. 
These two studies demonstrate the potential existence of intertemporal relationships among 
risk, capital, and efficiency in banks. 
                                                                
2 The stock market has been only serving a limited number of companies which are favoured by the government. 
3 According to the report of World Bank (2014), the level capitalisation of Vietnamese banking system is the 
lowest among ASEAN countries. In addition, the actual figure of NPL should be at least two digits, which was 
much higher than what was reported by the State Bank of Vietnam. 
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Several studies adopted the framework of Berger and DeYoung (1997) and Kwan and 
Eisenbeis (1997) for a European banking system. Williams (2004) shows that inefficient 
banks are associated with an increase in problem loans in a sample of European saving banks. 
This is in line with those of Berger and DeYoung (1997). Using the similar methodology in a 
panel data framework, Fiordelisi, Marques-Ibanez, and Molyneux (2011) indicate that lower 
bank efficiency leads to higher risk and increases in bank capital precede cost efficiency 
improvements. This finding is in line with those by Kwan and Eisenbeis (1997), suggesting 
that more efficient banks appear to be better capitalised and capital levels are also positively 
associated with efficiency levels. In contrast, Altunbas et al. (2007) demonstrate that 
inefficient banks appear to have more capital and take on less risky activities.  
Regarding empirical studies in developing countries, especially in Asia-Pacific, mixed 
findings are also found. Tan and Floros (2013) indicate a negative relationship between bank 
risk and capitalisation and a positive relationship between risk and bank efficiency in China. 
Nguyen and Nghiem (2015) using the Indian data, however, show that a reduction in cost 
efficiency is followed by an increase in bank risk and a decrease in the capital ratio is 
followed by an increase in risk. In the context of the Vietnamese banking system, Nguyen, 
Nghiem and Roca (2016) suggest that earning asset diversification impacts risk, cost 
efficiency and bank capital negatively. 
Our paper has several contributions to the literature as follows.  First, prior studies show a 
lack of consistency in the relationships among bank risk, capitalisation and efficiency.  This 
study revisits whether the four hypotheses with the mnemonics ‘bad luck’, ‘bad 
management’, ‘skimping’, and ‘moral hazard’ exists in the Vietnamese banking system. 
Along with different management behaviours of banks, this could be due to differences in the 
choice of variables, sample size, analysis periods and estimation methods in the first-stage 
analysis4.  In order to mitigate this issue of input-output variables employed for frontier 
economic approaches, we use Data Envelopment Analysis with the use of standard financial 
ratios as outputs to estimate technical efficiency of banks. Second, while a number of studies 
are conducted in many countries, regions using different methods, the experience in emerging 
markets, especially Vietnam remains limited [Nguyen, Nghiem, and Roca (2016) may be one 
of the exceptions]. The experiences of other economies cannot be automatically applied to the 
banking system in underdeveloped economies because of the substantial differences in 
regulatory and economic environments and the level and quality of services associated with 
deposits and loans that exist in institutional reality. By providing the evidence in Vietnam, 
this will increase the external validity of the interrelationship between bank risk, 
capitalisation and efficiency in the Asia-Pacific region. This study focuses on the Vietnamese 
banking between 2007 and 2011 when there were significant changes in banks’ capital ratios. 
Therefore, our study provides useful policy and managerial applications. 
Our findings indicate that the technical efficiency level of Vietnamese banks is relatively low, 
suggesting that there is a room for Vietnamese banks to further improve efficiency so as to 
achieve world best practice. In addition, the findings show a positive impact of capital on 
bank efficiency, suggesting that banks with more capital operate more efficiently than those 
with less capital. Capital also impacts bank risk negatively. Together, the higher capital ratio 
could both improve bank performance and reduce bank credit risk. In addition, our results 
demonstrate that an improvement in banking efficiency precedes an increase in bank risk, 
supporting the skimping behaviour hypothesis. Furthermore, our findings indicate that in 
                                                                
4 The choice of inputs and outputs is comprehensively discussed by several studies such as Berger and 
Humphrey (1997). 
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general bank risk impacts capitalisation negatively, thus supporting the moral hazard 
hypothesis. In other words, high risk-taking is combined with higher leverage. Lastly, the 
findings suggest that more-diversified banks tend to be higher risk-taking and also have 
greater performance. The results in subsamples also reinforce the main findings.  
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 provides an overview of the 
Vietnamese banking system. Section 3 presents the methodology. Section 4 describes data 
used in this study. Section 5 discusses empirical findings while section 6 concludes. 
 
2. OVERVIEW OF THE VIETNAMESE BANKING SYSTEM 
 
During the past two decades, the banking system has transformed from one-tier to a two-tier 
system where the SBV acts as a true central bank, and commercial banking functions are 
transferred to state-owned commercial banks (SOCBs) and privately owned commercial 
banks (POCBs). Several reforms were also implemented with the objective of transforming 
banks into market-functioning and efficient institutions. The main focus of reforms has so far 
on the restructuring of SOCBs, which has long served as the lending arm of state-owned 
enterprises (SOEs). The rest of the banking system, approximately 50% of total bank assets 
(KPMG 2013) has a much-diversified structure. First, two policy banks have proven to be 
effective tools of the state in mobilising various resources, both domestically and 
internationally, to perform designated socio-political lending programs. Second, POCBs are 
generally the most market-oriented and primarily focus on serving consumers in particular 
regions. Their equity ownership is mainly distributed among private, foreign investors and 
state. Third, since Vietnam’s entry into the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2007, a 
number of foreign banks that have been operating in the market have led to fierce 
competition for deposits and loans. Two forms of foreign participation are greenfield 
investment and acquisitions of a minority share. In response, domestic banks should increase 
their competitiveness by utilising inputs and producing outputs efficiently or may have 
diversified away from their traditional business activities into new fee-based sources of 
revenue (Le 2017). Last, non-banking financial institutions (other credit institutions and 
investment banks and financial auxiliaries) also contribute to the amount of credit available in 
the financial system.  
Recently, the SBV announced capitalisation and prudential ratios according to the Basel 
framework. Commercial banks are now required to meet the minimum charter capital 
requirement. This may have considerable implications for bank management in terms of 
enhancing bank efficiency and stability to survive in an increasingly competitive market. As 
being a critical role in the Vietnamese economy, the efficiency and behaviours of commercial 
banks are of interest to various stakeholders including policy-makers, industry participants, 
and academics. 
 
3. METHODOLOGY 
 
3.1 Efficiency Estimation 
The literature suggests no consensus on the preferred method for determining the best 
practice frontier against which relative efficiency are measured. Two common approaches 
used to estimate bank efficiency include data envelopment analysis (DEA) and stochastic 
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frontier approach (SFA)5. DEA is selected in this study because it works well with small 
sample size (Evanoff & Israilevich 1991) and is less prone than SFA to specification error, 
thus is more flexible (Reinhard, Lovell & Thijssen 2000).  
Let us now consider the problem diagrammatically. Assume that we have eight banks (T1, 
T2… T8). In order to simplify the problem, we consider two efficiency ratios: R1 and R2 as 
shown in Figure 1.  
Figure 1 Diagrammatic presentation of the model 
 
Source: Adapted from Halkos and Salamouris (2004) 
The efficient frontier is created by four efficient banks: T1, T2, T3, and T4. Bank T5 is 
considered as inefficient as it does not lie on the frontier. Point Tμ determines the optimal 
level of efficiency and is considered as the reference point, which is used for the 
measurement of the relative efficiency of bank T5. The portion by which Tμ exceeds T5 shows 
the size of inefficiency. The degree of efficiency for bank T5 is found the ratio of the 
distances OT5/OTμ. This follows the model specification proposed by Halkos and Salamouris 
(2004). They suggest that inputs can be considered similar and equal for all banks as they 
operate in the same markets for money and services.  
The 	banks produce a vector of output  in the form of the financial ratios6. The matrix of 
outputs  ( 1,2,3,… . , ) is known for each bank or a Decision Making Unit (DMU)  
( 1,2,3, … . , ). The  variables to be estimated are a set of weights  
	 , , , … . ,  placed on each of the banks in creating the efficiency frontier for the 
firm ( ) and an efficiency measure	 . It is important to note that if a bank wishes to increase 
its score it would be best to focus on those outputs, with the highest weight as the efficiency 
score is most sensitive to those outputs. 
Then the linear program for each bank can be formulated under the output-oriented model as 
follows: 
	 		  
Subject to 
                                                                
5 Berger and Humphrey (1997) provide a comprehensive discussion on economic frontier techniques. 
6 In our study, the values of ratios are non-negative. Thus the model is justified.  
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	 1,2,3,… . ,  
∑ 1           (1) 
0 
0	 1,2,3,… . ,  
The efficiency score for each DMU is given by ∗  and	0 ∗ 1. DMUs are 
considered as technically efficient if ∗ 1 and all slacks zero7.  
3.2 A simultaneous equations model 
A two-stage framework is used in our study.  In the first stage, the technical efficiency scores 
of banks are obtained using the DEA with the use of financial ratios as described above. In 
the second stage, a simultaneous equations model is used to examine the interrelationships 
between risk, capital, and efficiency. Several approaches are often used in the literature such 
as 2SLS (Kwan & Eisenbeis 1997), SUR (Altunbas et al. 2007) and Granger causality test 
(Berger & DeYoung 1997; Fiordelisi, Marques-Ibanez & Molyneux 2011; Williams 2004). 
Nguyen and Nghiem (2015) argue that results obtained from Granger causality are sensitive 
to model specification and the number of lags. In addition, Belsley (1988) suggested that 
3SLS can be more efficient than 2SLS, a relative advantage that increases with the strength of 
the interrelations among the error terms. Therefore, the 3SLS estimator which combines 
2SLS and SUR is adopted. 
Following Altunbas et al. (2007), the ratio of loan loss reserves total assets (RISK) is used to 
measure bank risk derived from accounting information since data on non-performing loans 
are unavailable for most banks. Higher levels of reserves are suggestive of greater banking 
risk8. Bank capitalisation (CAP) is measured by the ratio of total equity to total assets while 
technical efficiency (TEFF) is obtained from the DEA with the use of financial ratios. 
Therefore, RISK, CAP, and TEFF represent the three endogenous variables in the 
simultaneous equation system, with two right-hand-side endogenous variables in each of the 
three equations. The model is completed by adding exogenous variables that have 
explanatory power for each of the above endogenous variables. The model is specified as 
follows: 
, , , , , ,    (2) 
, , , , , 	 , ,   (3) 
, , , 	 , , ,  (4) 
                                                                
7 Note that if an efficiency score of 1 but a slack value is positive then the model has identified a point on the 
efficient frontier but still has excess on an output, which corresponds to the positive slack. This suggests that 
this DMU is not Pareto-efficient because its outputs cannot be expanded jointly; see Halkos and Salamouris 
(2004). 
8 Borio (2003) suggested that banks build more provision in good times and run them down in the case of 
unfavourable economic conditions and an increase in loans defaults. As such banks with higher levels of 
reserves could be considered as a lower risk. However, Altunbas et al. (2007) argued that banks with higher 
levels of reserves have an expectation of higher future risk, thus, are riskier. 
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Berger and DeYoung (1997) indicated four types of managerial hypothesis underlying the 
interrelationships among bank risk, capital and operating efficiency that include: bad 
management, bad luck, moral hazard and skimping.  
As per the bad management hypothesis, banks with poor management may fail to control 
operating costs or monitor borrowers, thus resulting in higher risk. Also, less efficient banks 
tend to be more prone to risk-taking due to a lower value of their charter capitals. According 
to the skimping costs hypothesis, banks tend to skimp on operating costs by reducing credit 
monitoring, collateral valuing and marketing activities to achieve short-run economic 
efficiency. These activities, however, would deteriorate loan quality which ultimately leads to 
higher risk. In addition, inefficient banks are subject to more regulatory scrutiny. Thus they 
are required to hold higher capital ratios (Kwan & Eisenbeis 1997).  
The bad luck hypothesis argues that banks are required to expend additional managerial 
efforts, additional resources/inputs to address credit risk caused by external events such as 
financial shocks. As a result, this reduces banks’ efficiency. On the other hand, the costs of 
managing credit risk may be reduced with the level of risk exposure due to credit screening. 
The conventional view suggests that managerial quality banks with more capital and less 
leverage are likely to be more efficient than those with less capital (Kwan & Eisenbeis 1997). 
CAP, therefore, is positively associated with TEFF. Furthermore, the moral hazard 
hypothesis postulates poorly capitalised banks that face risks due to a reduced capital ratio 
have incentives to take risky portfolios. Consequently, a negative impact of the CAP on RISK 
is expected. 
Following prior studies such as Fu, Lin, and Molyneux (2015) and Nguyen and Nghiem 
(2015), we use bank profitability (ROAA) and bank intermediation (LD) as control variables 
for CAP (equation 2). ROAA, the ratio of profit before tax to average total assets, is included 
to control for bank’s profitability. The charter value hypothesis suggests that a profitable 
bank may improve capital ratios, all else being equal, to protect its charter value (Keeley 
1990). As per the pecking order theory of finance, increasing extra capital may be costly. It 
thus may be easier to accumulate capital via higher retained earnings. LD, the ratio of gross 
loans to total deposits, is included to control for the effects of bank intermediation. 
Accordingly, banks with the higher level of intermediation of deposit to loans could obtain 
greater earning – thus, resulting in higher level of capital.  
We also use lending specialization (LA), bank size (SIZE) and bank diversification (DIV), as 
control variables for TEFF (equation 3). LA, the ratio of gross loans to total assets, is 
included to control for lending specialization. Accordingly, a greater loan-to-asset ratio may 
suggest higher market power in loan markets. The efficient structure hypothesis demonstrates 
that market power in loan markets may be a consequence of efficient operations. Because of 
the ability to control their operations more productively, relatively efficient banks may have 
lower production costs, which allow them to offer more reasonable loan terms and thus 
gaining larger market shares over their inefficient competitors. LA thus is expected to have a 
positive effect on TEFF (Isik & Hassan 2003; Nguyen & Nghiem 2015). SIZE, the natural 
logarithm of total assets, is included to control for bank size. Due to economies of scale, 
SIZE is expected to have a positive impact on TEFF (Andries 2011; Drake 2001). DIV, the 
ratio of off-balance sheet items to total assets, is included to control for bank diversification 
towards off-balance sheet activities. According to the conglomeration hypothesis, diversified 
banks can leverage managerial skills and abilities across products and services (Iskandar-
Datta & McLaughlin 2005) and gain economies of scope through spreading fixed costs over 
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multiple products (Drucker & Puri 2009). Diversification thus has a positive impact on bank 
efficiency. The increased income generated from diversification, however, would be offset by 
the costs for non-lending products (Nguyen & Nghiem 2015). Diversification, therefore, 
impacts bank efficiency negatively. 
Furthermore, we use excessive lending (LA), bank diversification (DIV), economic growth 
(GDP) and inflation (INF) as control variables for RISK (equation 4). LA, the ratio of gross 
loans to total assets, is used to control for excessive lending. Banks may intend to seize new 
lending opportunities, expand to new geographic markets or increase market share with 
existing products and markets (Rossi, Schwaiger & Winkler 2009). Under this presumption 
that new loans are advanced to borrowers who were previously rejected, perhaps too little 
collateral relative to their credit quality, excessive lending may increase bank risk. DIV, the 
ratio of off-balance sheet activities to total assets, is used to control for the effects of bank 
diversification. Conventional wisdom in banking suggests that diversification could reduce 
bank risk. In contrast, Berger, Hasan and Zhou (2010) emphasise that aggressive 
diversification strategies may lead to increased risk-taking. Similarly, Acharya, Hasan and 
Saunders (2006) demonstrate that diseconomies of scope arise through weakened monitoring 
incentives and a poorer quality loan portfolio when a risky bank expands into additional 
industries and sectors. This is also due to the issue of agency costs (Deng & Elyasiani 2008). 
For that reason, diversification impacts on bank risk positively. GDP, the economic growth 
rate, is used to control for the economic condition that influence banks’ investment 
opportunity and therefore bank risk-taking behavior.  INF, the inflation rate, is used to control 
for the effects of inflation. 
 
4. DATA 
 
In our analysis, only Vietnamese commercial banks between 2007 and 2011are considered. 
Foreign banks and joint-venture banks are excluded from our analysis as they were much 
more restricted in bank entry and banking activities. Due to the data sample must be 
homogeneous when using DEA for assessing efficiency, this exclusion ensures maximum 
feasible comparability among banks. After accounting for missing data, we obtain an 
unbalanced panel data in which these banks accounted for more than 80% of total assets in 
the banking industry. The data were collected from the balance sheets and profit and loss 
accounts of the banks under consideration.  
A variety of financial ratios are used for this evaluation with each ratio to provide indications 
for technical efficiency of a bank. Following Halkos and Salamouris (2004), we initially 
considered five common financial ratios as outputs that include: return difference of interest-
bearing assets (RDIBA)9; the ratio of profits before tax to average total equity (ROAE); 
efficiency ratio10 (EFF); net interest margin11 (NIM); the ratio of profits before tax to average 
total assets (ROAA). For reasons of convenience with the other indices as described in Figure 
1, EFF is used in our analysis as 1/EFF. ROAE, NIM, and ROAA are three main measures of 
                                                                
9 This is measured by the difference between the interest receivable and similar income-to-the average interest-
bearing assets ratio and the interest payable and similar charges-to-the average interest-bearing liabilities ratio. 
The larger RDIBA is, the more efficient the management of the bank’s capital is. 
10 This is measured by the ratio of the operational expenses to total net income. The smaller EFF is the more 
efficient the bank is because the percentage of the bank’s income generated is sufficient to cover its operating 
expenses. 
11 The ratio of the net income to average total assets 
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bank profitability in the literature. Following the suggestion of Halkos and Salamouris 
(2004), ROAA should be excluded from our analysis because ROAA is highly correlated 
with EFF and NIM with using a correlation of about 0.7 as a cut off as presented in Table 
1.12Therefore, four financial ratios used as outputs in DEA include RDIBA, ROAE, EFF, and 
NIM. Given our unbalanced panel data, a set of 1x4 inputs and outputs is used in our study 
which is consistent with DEA literature. Dyson et al. (2001) suggest that sample size should 
be at least three times larger than the sum of inputs and outputs to discriminate between the 
units.  
 
Table 1 Correlation matrix between financial ratios used in DEA 
  RDIBA ROAE EFFa NIM ROAA 
RDIBA 1 
ROAE 0.134 1 
EFFa 0.198 0.287 1 
NIM 0.399 0.194 0.380 1 
ROAA 0.287 0.297 0.784 0.704 1 
 Note: a the data of EFF was transformed. 
Descriptive statistics of variables used in this study are presented in Table 2. 
 
Table 2 Descriptive statistics of variables used in this study 
Variables 2011 2010 2009 2008 2007 
Number of banks                                              33                 37           
37         33        27 
Financial ratios used for efficiency estimation 
RDIBA 4.573b 3.622 3.404 2.895 3.085 
(2.610)c (2.336) (1.789) (1.491) (1.138) 
ROAE 15.745 16.772 16.749 13.846 22.695 
(8.662) (8.003) (8.148) (9.871) (12.421) 
EFFa 0.022 0.025 0.025 0.022 0.031 
(0.005) (0.007) (0.007) (0.009) (0.011) 
NIM 3.539 2.813 3.204 2.940 3.169 
(1.410) (0.936) (1.342) (1.615) (1.613) 
   
                                                                
12 This rule may vary depending on the study of the discipline. 
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Variables used for assessing the interrelationships between bank risk, capital, and 
efficiency 
RISK 0.715 0.657 0.621 0.617 0.488 
(0.578) (0.525) (0.539) (0.632) (0.630) 
CAP 11.490 11.954 13.764 15.038 12.878 
(6.837) (6.927) (11.920) (9.770) (8.613) 
LA 46.242 47.853 55.177 54.196 52.246 
(15.479) (13.811) (17.291) (13.981) (13.683) 
LD 102.878 95.772 108.667 100.553 125.261 
(38.697) (22.523) (52.854) (30.751) (71.969) 
DIV 7.963 7.218 6.915 7.530 10.651 
(10.847) (10.022) (8.895) (10.546) (15.403) 
SIZE 17.962 17.683 17.176 16.880 16.888 
(1.108) (1.132) (1.305) (1.364) (1.359) 
ROAA 1.679 1.776 2.070 1.637 2.587 
(0.965) (0.971) (1.111) (1.381) (1.519) 
GDP  6.240 6.423 5.398 5.662 7.130 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
INF  21.261 12.074 6.216 22.673 9.630 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Notes: a the data of EFF was transformed; b,c mean and standard deviation value of the 
variable, respectively 
 
5. RESULTS 
 
5.1 Technical efficiency of the Vietnamese banking system, 2007 - 2011 
As mentioned above, the financial ratios are treated as output variables, while a dummy-input 
(equals to 1) is set for all banks in the sample. Figure 2 shows the technical efficiency level of 
the Vietnamese banking system between 2007 and 201113. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                
13 The results of technical efficiency score of each bank over the examined period cannot be presented due to 
length restrictions but are available upon request. 
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Figure 2: Technical efficiency of Vietnamese banks, 2007-2011 
 
The average technical efficiency score of banks over the five-year period is 0.72. This value 
fits within the range of the scores found in other overseas studies but is lower than the world 
mean efficiency. As indicated by Berger and Humphrey (1997), the mean efficiency score is 
in the range of 0.55 (UK) to 0.95 (France). This suggests that there is a room for Vietnamese 
banks to further improve efficiency so as to achieve world best practice (i.e., banks can 
increase outputs produced by 28%).  
Furthermore, this appears as a significant reduction in bank efficiency in 2008. However, 
there is a slight improvement in technical efficiency in 2009 and remains levelled off between 
2010 and 2011,14 suggesting that the Vietnamese banking system is less affected by the GFC. 
This recovery could be explained by the fact that banks gained benefits from the 
government’s stimulus packages. A large amount of money was injected into the economy by 
the government through commercial banks channel. This enables banks to increase lending 
from this cheap fund, thus may improve bank efficiency. 
5.2 Management behaviours 
Table 3 presents the correlation matrix of the various variables that are used in this study. For 
the convenience, we focus on the interpretation of the correlation between CAP, TEFF, and 
RISK. At first glance, there is a positive relationship between TEFF and CAP and a negative 
relationship between RISK and CAP. The correlations of other control variables in three 
equations as above are also reported. As can be seen in Table 3, there are no high correlations 
between explanatory variables in a single equation. However, the intertemporal relationships 
among CAP, TEFF and RISK can be only addressed by using a simultaneous equations 
model as presented in the following section. 
The simultaneous equations system is fitted by pooled time-series cross-section observations 
using the 3SLS estimation.  
                                                                
14  Since our data is unbalanced, and particularly because the purpose of this study is to investigate the 
interrelationship between bank efficiency, capitalisation, and risk, we have not focused on the productivity 
change over time for the Vietnamese banking system. Nonetheless, this is well beyond the scope of our study, 
thus leaving this for future research. 
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Table 3 Correlation matrix of key variables 
 CAP  TEFF  RISK  ROAA  LD  LA  SIZE  DIV  GDP INF 
CAP  1.000          
TEFF  0.187** 1.000         
 (2.440)          
RISK  -0.258*** 0.103 1.000        
 (-3.431) (1.326)         
ROAA 0.603*** 0.629 -0.180 1.000       
 (9.710) (10.399) (-2.345)        
LD  0.529*** 0.086 0.006 0.429 1.000      
 (8.018) (1.112) (0.081) (6.106)       
LA  0.122 -0.044 0.494*** 0.103 0.447 1.000     
 (1.573) (-0.567) (7.291) (1.334) (6.427)      
SIZE  -0.733 0.104 0.522 -0.437 -0.431 -0.02 1.000    
 (-13.833) (1.338) (7.868) (-6.243) (-6.136) (-0.255)     
DIV  -0.262 0.138* 0.402*** -0.028 -0.255 0.024 0.436 1.000   
 (-3.480) (1.789) (5.646) (-0.360) (-3.381) (0.310) (6.218)    
GDP -0.082 -0.035 -0.049 0.133 0.091 -0.121 0.042 0.092 1.000  
 (-1.053) (-0.443) (-0.636) (1.724) (1.180) (-1.565) (0.537) (1.189)   
INF 0.009 -0.111 0.055 -0.189 -0.093 -0.082 0.066 -0.007 -0.055 1.000 
 (0.117) (-1.431) (0.707) (-2.476) (-1.197) (-1.057) (0.845) (-0.090) (-
0.709) 
 
Notes: CAP, the ratio of total equity to total assets; TEFF, technical efficiency scores of banks; RISK, the ratio of loan loss reserves to total 
assets; ROAA, the ratio of profit before tax to the average total asset; LD, the ratio of gross loans to total deposits, LA, the ratio of gross loans to 
total assets, SIZE, the natural logarithm of total assets; DIV, the ratio of off-balance sheet items to total assets; GDP, the economic growth rate; 
INF, the inflation rate. t-statistics are shown in parentheses, **, *** Significant at 5, 1 percent levels, respectively. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4 Determinants of bank capitalisation 
CAP 
TEFF -35.644***(-4.718) 
RISK -3.585**(-2.337) 
ROAA 7.310***(7.244) 
LD 0.022*(1.602) 
Constant 24.561***(5.808) 
Adjusted R2 0.275 
Number of observations 167 
 
Notes: CAP, the ratio of total equity to total assets; TEFF, technical efficiency scores of banks as 
obtained from DEA; RISK, the ratio of loan loss reserves to total assets, ROAA, the ratio of 
profit before tax to the average total assets; LD, the ratio of gross loans to total deposits. The 
table contains the results estimated using a simultaneous equations model with the 3SLS 
estimator. CAP, TEFF, and RISK represent the three endogenous variables in the simultaneous 
equations system. t-statistics are shown in parentheses, *, **, *** Significant at 10, 5, 1 per cent 
levels, respectively. 
The results of the determinants of bank capitalisation are indicated in Table 4. The coefficient of 
TEFF is significant and negative, suggesting that banks often respond to a decline in operating 
efficiency by raising capital as a precautionary step. RISK15 is significantly and negatively 
related to CAP – thus, the moral hazard hypothesis may exist. This result is in line with findings 
of Fiordelisi, Marques-Ibanez and Molyneux (2011) in European banking.  Brewer, Jackson and 
Moser (1996) argue that when deposit insurance premiums are not risk-sensitive, managers 
invest in high-risk assets at discounted rates while simultaneously extending financial leverage to 
improve returns. In other words, moral hazard bank behaviour is indicative of high risk-taking 
which is combined with higher leverage. ROAA is positively and significantly associated with 
CAP, confirming that profitability leads to higher capital. This finding is in line with those of 
Kwan and Eisenbeis (1997) in the US banking system. Lastly, the coefficient of LD is significant 
and positive, implying that banks with the higher level of intermediation of deposit to loans 
could generate higher earnings, which ultimately leads to greater bank capital. 
The results of determinants of bank efficiency are presented in the following table. As can be 
seen in Table 5, the coefficient of CAP is positive and significant, suggesting that banks with 
more capital operate more efficiently than those with less capital. This supports the view that 
moral hazard incentives are reduced as bank capital increases because more-capitalised banks are 
more likely to cut costs than less-capitalised counterparts. 
  
                                                                
15 We also use Z-score as a proxy for bank risk. The coefficient of Z-score is statistically not significant in all 
models although the table of results cannot be presented due to the space restrictions. Nonetheless, the results are 
available upon request. 
AABFJ  |  Volume 12, no. 3, 2018 
 
54 
Table 5 The determinants of bank efficiency 
TEFF 
CAP 0.031**(2.343) 
RISK -2.774***(-3.380) 
LA 0.049***(3.171) 
SIZE 0.710***(3.564) 
DIV 0.029***(3.167) 
Constant -13.010***(-3.380) 
Adjusted R2 -33.186 
No. of Obs 167 
 
Notes: CAP, the ratio of total equity to total assets; TEFF, technical efficiency scores of banks; 
RISK, the ratio of loan loss reserves to total assets; LA, the ratio of gross loans to total assets; 
SIZE, the natural logarithm of total assets; DIV, the ratio of off-balance sheet items to total 
assets. The table contains the results estimated using a simultaneous equations model with the 
3SLS estimator. CAP, TEFF, and RISK represent the three endogenous variables in the 
simultaneous equations system. t-statistics are shown in parentheses, **, *** Significant at 5, 1 
percent levels, respectively. 
RISK is negatively and significantly related to TEFF, thus supporting the bad luck hypothesis. 
According to this hypothesis, external events (the global financial crisis) precipitate an increase 
in risk for the banks (perhaps, loan defaults). Banks have to purchase the additional inputs 
necessary to administer these problem credits. This finding somewhat conflicts with those of 
Stewart, Matousek and Nguyen (2016) who found no relationship between bank risk and 
efficiency in Vietnam. In their paper, an ordinary least square estimation is not a robust method 
since it ignores the correlation of error term across equations. In addition, LA is positively and 
significantly associated with TEFF, suggesting that banks with higher loans-to-assets ratio tend 
to have greater technical efficiency levels. This also emphasizes that bank loans seem to be more 
highly valued than alternative bank outputs (investment and securities) in Vietnam. The finding 
is in line with those of Kwan and Eisenbeis (1997) in the US  and Nguyen and Nghiem (2015) in 
India. Furthermore, SIZE is found to have a positive impact on TEFF, suggesting that larger 
banks are more efficient than smaller counterparts. This finding is comparable to those of Minh, 
Long and Hung (2013) and Stewart, Matousek and Nguyen (2016) in Vietnam.  This can be 
explained by two main following reasons. Large banks should pay less for their inputs if it 
relates to market power. Also, there may be by increasing returns to scale through the allocation 
of fixed costs over a higher volume of services or from efficiency gains from a specialised 
workforce (Hauner 2005). In addition, DIV is significantly and positively related to TEFF, 
suggesting that diversification towards OBS activities is able to improve bank efficiency. This 
supports earlier findings of Sufian (2009) in Malaysia, Jeon and Miller (2005) in Korea. This can 
be explained by the following reasons. First, diversified banks can leverage managerial skills and 
abilities across products and services (Iskandar-Datta & McLaughlin 2005) and gain economies 
of scope by spreading fixed costs over multiple products (Drucker & Puri 2009). Second, they 
can provide more services to customers who demand multiple products and are willing to pay for 
extra convenience, thus increasing their income (Berger, Hasan & Zhou 2010).  
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The results of determinants of bank risk are shown in Table 6. CAP is found to have a negative 
impact on bank risk, suggesting that banks with relatively more capital (less leverage) tend to 
have less credit risk. The coefficient of TEFF is significant and positive, suggesting that 
supervisory authorities may allow efficient banks (with high-quality management) a greater 
flexibility in terms of their capital leverage – thus, more investing in risky assets. This is in line 
with the findings of Hughes and Mester (1998) who found that  
higher risk is positively associated with more efficient banks.  
Table 6 The determinants of bank risk 
RISK  
CAP -0.037***(-7.483) 
TEFF 0.605**(2.474) 
LA 0.021***(9.494) 
DIV 0.011***(3.754) 
GDP 0.095**(2.453) 
INF 0.002(0.637) 
Constant -1.104***(-3.194) 
Adjusted R2 0.347 
No. of Obs 167 
 
Notes: CAP, the ratio of total equity to total assets; TEFF, technical efficiency score of banks; 
RISK, the ratio of loan loss reserves to total assets; LA, the ratio of gross loans to total assets; 
DIV, the ratio of off-balance sheet items to total assets; GDP, the economic growth rate; INF, the 
inflation rate. The table contains the results estimated using a simultaneous equations model with 
the 3SLS estimator. CAP, TEFF, and RISK represent the three endogenous variables in the 
simultaneous equations system. t-statistics are shown in parentheses, **, *** Significant at 5, 1 
percent levels, respectively. 
Furthermore, LA is significantly and positively associated with RISK, suggesting that 
excessively lending may increase risk faced by banks. In fact, the accelerating pace of lending 
between 2007 and 2011, especially advancing to non-deposit sources, potentially exposed the 
Vietnamese banking sector to higher liquidity risk. This result is comparable to those of Amador, 
Gómez-González and Pabón (2013), demonstrating that significant credit expansions do not 
generate corresponding increases in bank safety margins. The coefficient of DIV is significant 
and positive, implying that aggressive diversification strategies may have resulted in increased 
risk-taking. This is in line with those of Deng and Elyasiani (2008) and Le (2017), indicating that 
diversification benefits are offset by increased bank risk. In addition, GDP is significantly and 
positively related to RISK, suggesting that Vietnamese banks tend to pursue a massive lending 
and investment opportunities during the expansion of the economy – thus, they may face greater 
risk. INF is found to have no impact on bank risk. 
5.3 Robustness Check 
We further examine whether the interrelationship between risk, capitalisation and technical 
efficiency differ between small and large banks as presented in the following tables. Following 
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Berger and Bouwman (2009) and Le (forthcoming), large and small banks are defined as those 
with total assets greater and less than the median value, respectively.  
Table 7 The relationships between risk, capital and efficiency for large banks 
 CAP  TEFF  RISK  
TEFF -14.840***(-
2.633) 
   0.285(0.570)  
RISK -0.748(-1.101)  -0.397(-1.535)    
CAP   0.039(1.532)  -0.123***(-
4.405) 
 
Constant 12.366***(3.852
) 
 -4.114***(-3.564)  -0.680(-0.968)  
Adjusted 
R2 
0.298  -1.363  0.341  
No. of 
Obs  
83  83  83  
 
Notes: CAP, the ratio of total equity to total assets; TEFF, technical efficiency scores of banks; 
RISK is the ratio of loan loss reserves to total assets. The table contains the results estimated 
using a simultaneous equations model with the 3SLS estimator. CAP, TEFF, and RISK represent 
the three endogenous variables in the simultaneous equation system. The same set of control 
variables is used as above, but the coefficients of these variables are not presented due to space 
constraints. Large banks are classified as those with total assets greater than the median value. t-
statistics are shown in parentheses, *** Significant at 1 percent levels, respectively. 
Table 8 The relationships between risk, capital and efficiency for small banks 
 CAP TEFF RISK  
TEFF -17.079(-1.485)    0.963***(5.748)  
RISK -8.954*(-1.916)  0.744(1.156)    
CAP   0.029**(2.103)  -0.024***(-6.658)  
Constant 18.334***(2.970)  -0.892(-0.214)  -0.513**(-2.151)  
Adjusted 
R2 
0.221  -0.868  -0.005  
No. of 
Obs 
84  84  84  
 
Notes: CAP, the ratio of total equity to total assets; TEFF, technical efficiency scores of banks; 
RISK is the ratio of loan loss reserves to total assets. The table contains the results estimated 
using a simultaneous equations model with the 3SLS estimator. CAP, TEFF, and RISK represent 
the three endogenous variables in the simultaneous equation system. The same set of control 
variables is used as above, but the coefficients of these variables are not presented due to space 
constraints. Small banks are classified as those with total assets less than the median value. t-
statistics are shown in parentheses, *,**, *** Significant at 10, 5, 1 percent levels, respectively. 
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Tables 7-8 show that CAP is found to have a positive impact on TEFF. Also, CAP is negatively 
associated with RISK regardless of bank sizes. Consequently, firms with more capital operate 
more efficiently and have the lower risk. In addition, TEFF is negatively related to CAP and has 
a positive impact on RISK. This confirms that Vietnamese banks tend to skimp on operating 
costs by reducing credit monitoring and collateral valuing in order to achieve efficiency in the 
short run. Vietnamese banks, however, would be exposed to greater credit risk in the long run. 
Last, RISK is significantly and negatively related to CAP for the case of small banks, supporting 
the moral hazard hypothesis. Nonetheless, these findings confirm our main findings as discussed 
above. 
 
6. CONCLUSIONS 
 
This study investigates the links among bank risk, capitalisation and technical efficiency in 
Vietnamese banking between 2007 and 2011 using the 3SLS estimation in a simultaneous 
equations model. The efficiency level of Vietnamese banking system as derived from DEA with 
the use of financial ratios appears to be relatively low, suggesting that there is a room for banks 
to further improve efficiency so as to achieve world best practice.  
Our main findings indicate that banks with more capital operate more efficiently than those with 
less capital, indicating the level of capitalisation is a good proxy for performance. Capital also 
appears to have a negative impact on bank risk, implying that a higher capital ratio could not 
only improve bank efficiency but also reduce bank credit risk. Therefore, our findings strongly 
support the view of SBV that an increase in the minimum charter capital requirement would be 
beneficial for Vietnamese banks. In fact, the current minimum requirement on bank capital 
adequacy in Vietnam is much lower than what is suggested in BASEL III.  
At the same time, technical efficiency is related to bank risk-taking. Our findings indicated that 
an improvement in banking efficiency precedes an increase in bank risk, supporting the skimping 
behaviour. This suggests that supervisors must pay special attention to the bank’s internal credit 
control procedures (i.e. loan monitoring and review, collateral valuing). More importantly, our 
findings demonstrate the negative impact of bank risk on capitalisation. This implies that moral 
hazard bank behaviour is indicative of high risk-taking is combined with higher leverage. In 
addition, our findings also show that more-diversified banks tend to be higher risk-taking and 
have better performance. Our main findings still hold in subsamples.  
It is worth to mention that each of these results has a relatively small impact on banks on average 
but may have a substantial effect on individual banks that are most subject to bad luck, bad 
management, skimping and/or moral hazard. 
While this study examines only one emerging market and a limited period of study, it suggests 
the need for future research in other emerging nations that have similar banking structure for the 
robustness of our main findings. Perhaps, alternative techniques (bootstrap DEA as suggested by 
Simar and Wilson (1998, 2000) or SFA)  could be used to estimate the technical efficiency of 
banks. 
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